A new study published in Evolution & Human Behavior finds that men tend to underestimate how upset women would feel after sexual assault by an intimate partner, while women tend to overestimate how upset men would feel.

Theory of mind is often treated as a general cognitive skill. However, evolutionary perspectives suggest that mind-reading may be partly domain-specific, especially in areas where men and women have historically faced different adaptive challenges. One such domain is sexual violence, where women have disproportionately experienced victimization and its associated physical, reproductive, and psychological costs.

Dr. Rebecka K. Hahnel-Peeters, an assistant professor in the Department of Psychology at Indiana State University, explained, “It’s hard to narrow down what drew me to this topic, but three primary influences stand out: (1) a larger lab interest in the domain-specificity of theory of mind, (2) my interest in replication efforts, and (3) the topic’s connection to my broader research program on sexual victimization and threat management.”

Hahnel-Peeters described how the project emerged from a collaborative effort. “This paper began as part of a larger lab discussion about whether theory of mind was domain-specific in its content. Theory of mind is our ability to infer others’ knowledge, thoughts, emotions, and desires—and importantly, to recognize that these mental states may differ from our own. Previous work has explored when perceptual errors in inferences about the opposite-sex’s mental states might be favored by selection (e.g., Haselton & Buss, 2000).”

“My colleagues, William Costello and Paola Baca, were equally interested in perceptual errors and biases in cross-sex theory of mind, particularly in judgments of sexual desire. We decided a group project was in order, each selecting a domain within mating psychology to explore. This naturally led me to consider opportunities for replication.”

The replication focus was central, the author shared, “Our mentor and co-author, Dr. David Buss, previously documented that men tend to underestimate how upsetting sexual aggression perpetrated by a romantic partner is to the average woman (Buss, 1989). Women were also inaccurate in estimating men’s reactions to such aggression. Those data were collected in the late 1980s. Given how much time has passed—and considering the increased awareness surrounding sexual violence following the 2017 #MeToo movement—I was curious whether these effects would replicate today.”

“If the misperception replicated, there were important implications for how we prosecute sexual violence. Much prosecution of sexual violence relies on the reasonable person standard — if the acts committed by the alleged perpetrator would cause a ‘reasonable person’ fear. This assumes men and women have a shared baseline of emotional responses to sexually threatening behavior. If a ‘reasonable man’ consistently differs from a ‘reasonable woman,’ then our current legal standards may be mismatched to the reality of sexual violence.”

The researchers recruited participants through social media and the participant pool at The University of Texas at Austin. The final sample included 781 participants, 61% of whom were female, ranging in age from 18-67 years. The design required participants to rate their own reactions, as well as the reactions of the “average man” and “average woman,” across multiple domains.

To measure emotional upset, participants rated 150 behaviors originally drawn from Buss (1989), including four items reflecting sexual aggression by an intimate partner, such as being forced to have sex. They also reported their fear of rape and other crimes, along with their perceived likelihood of being victimized by crimes such as sexual assault and sexual harassment.

In addition, participants completed measures assessing sociosexual orientation, Dark Triad traits (Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy), empathy, self-perceived mate value, and perceived formidability. These individual difference measures allowed the authors to test whether cross-sex errors reflected adaptive inferential biases or instead were explained by projection of one’s own reactions.

“American men and women tend to systematically misperceive eachothers’ emotional upset in the domain of sexual violence perpetrated by one’s romantic partner, and this misperception is surprisingly stable across time,” Hahnel-Peeters told PsyPost.

“Although it’s true that both men and women accurately reported [that] the average woman experiences more upset, men significantly underestimated the upset that women actually reported. This has important implications for interpersonal communication, empathy, and legal contexts. We hope educating about these biases may improve education, prevention efforts, and how we define a ‘reasonable person’ in sexual violence cases.”

In contrast, men were relatively accurate in estimating women’s fear of rape and perceived likelihood of sexual victimization, while women overestimated men’s perceived likelihood of victimization.

Analyses of individual differences revealed that most cross-sex errors were strongly predicted by participants’ own self-ratings. For example, men’s underestimation of women’s upset was primarily explained by how upset the men themselves reported they would feel. Dark Triad traits and sociosexual orientation did not robustly predict these errors in the upset domain, lending more support to the byproduct (egocentric bias) hypothesis than to a specialized adaptive bias account, although some personality traits (e.g., psychopathy, Machiavellianism) were linked to errors in perceived likelihood and fear.

When asked if there are any caveats, the author emphasized “Absolutely, as with any study.”

“Although we replicated key patterns found in the late 1980s, these data are confined to the contexts of undergraduate students in the United States. Our data cannot definitively determine if these misperceptions result from evolved design features or byproducts of some other cognitive system. We tested several theoretically relevant individual differences, but future research would benefit from more diverse participants and methodology to better evaluate the adaptive vs. byproduct hypotheses.”

Hahnel-Peeters also highlighted unanswered questions. “Future research could examine cross-sex mindreading across cultures, such as those differing in sexuality or gender norms. To further test predictions about how reproductive status may calibrate theory of mind in this domain, future research should include a greater age range — specifically sampling for post-menopausal women. Another question includes how jurors’ individual differences in the magnitude of error influences perceived victim and perpetrator culpability. We’re only just beginning to understand these misperceptions.”

Taken together, the findings suggest that cross-sex misunderstandings in the domain of sexual violence are systematic, stable across decades, and shaped in part by individuals’ own emotional baselines.

“This project highlights that even well-meaning individuals can hold inaccurate beliefs about the opposite sex’s experiences with sexual violence. These gaps in perceptions hold real consequences. A better understanding of these perceptual errors support better policy-making, prevention efforts, and support for victims.”

The research “Cross-sex theory of mind in the domain of sexual violence: upset, fear, and perceived likelihood” was authored by Rebecka K. Hahnel-Peeters, William Costello, Paola Baca, David P. Schmitt, and David M. Buss.

Evolutionary psychology hypotheses can be rigorously tested, and sometimes decisively overturned, challenging the long-standing claim that the field is inherently unfalsifiable, according to a conceptual review published in American Psychologist.

Since the 1970s, critics have contended that evolutionary explanations of human behavior amount to “just-so stories,” plausible but empirically untestable narratives flexible enough to accommodate virtually any outcome.

Drawing on Popper’s philosophy of science, these critiques claim that evolutionary psychology fails the criterion of falsifiability and therefore lacks scientific rigor, a perception that has persisted both within academia and public discourse.

William Costello, a doctoral researcher at the University of Texas at Austin explains, “As a graduate student preparing to go on the job market I am passionate about correcting the many misconceptions about evolutionary psychology that pervade academia and cultural consciousness. Evolutionary psychology is enormously explanatorily powerful for a wide range of domains, so it is frustrating to constantly have to contend with the decades old ‘zombie idea’ that its hypotheses are unfalsifiable. This false perception may also prevent younger scholars from embracing the framework in their own work, so hopefully our paper can empower them to push back against uncharged criticisms when they face them.”

The article takes up that challenge by clarifying what falsifiability requires and by examining how evolutionary psychology constructs and evaluates its hypotheses.

The authors begin by specifying formal criteria for falsifiability: a hypothesis must generate explicit, prohibitive predictions that could, in principle, be contradicted by observable evidence. Vague or underspecified claims can evade disconfirmation, but the authors argue that this is a problem of imprecision, not a defining feature of evolutionary psychology.

They then situate evolutionary psychology within a Lakatosian research program structure. At the top sits evolutionary theory as a metatheoretical foundation; below it are middle-level theories (such as parental investment theory); and at the lowest level are specific hypotheses that generate concrete predictions. It is at this level that falsification operates. By distinguishing among these tiers, the authors argue that critics often mistake broad theoretical commitments for unfalsifiable claims, when in fact it is the lower-level predictions that are directly tested and, at times, rejected.

To demonstrate falsifiability in action, the authors review three prominent hypotheses that have been substantially weakened or refuted. First, the ovulatory shift (dual-mating) hypothesis predicted that women’s mate preferences would reliably shift toward traits signaling “good genes” during ovulation. Although early studies appeared supportive, larger and more rigorous replication efforts largely failed to confirm consistent fertility-linked preference shifts. The core prediction has not proven robust.

Second, the mate deprivation hypothesis of rape proposed that men lacking mating opportunities would be more likely to commit sexual violence. Empirical tests found the opposite pattern: men with greater mating success and higher status were more likely to report coercive behavior. These findings directly contradict the hypothesis’ central prediction.

Third, the kin altruism hypothesis for male homosexuality suggested that same-sex-attracted men would offset reduced direct reproduction by investing heavily in genetic relatives. Cross-cultural research has yielded mixed or negative evidence, and the level of kin investment observed does not appear sufficient to satisfy inclusive fitness requirements. As a result, the hypothesis lacks strong empirical support.

Alongside these refuted cases, the authors emphasize that many other evolutionary psychological hypotheses, such as those concerning parental investment, jealousy, disgust, and kin-directed altruism, have generated precise predictions that have received substantial empirical backing. The coexistence of confirmed and disconfirmed hypotheses, they argue, is exactly what one would expect in a progressive scientific field.

Reflecting on broader lessons, Costello noted: “There are many other leaders in the field (e.g., Ed Hagen) who have already tackled this problem well in other work. It would be nice to think that our article would be the final word and resolve the matter once and for all, but I think that because there are so many who are ideologically motivated to dismiss evolutionary psychology, scholars will need to defend against this misconception in each generation. We need to be prepared to do so and not allow misconceptions to flourish. There are those who think that we should not bother defensively correcting misconceptions and instead just focus on improving our field. I think we can and should do both.”

He added, “I think it’s good for scholars to have contemporary theoretical work in a leading psychology journal to now point to when they hear the myth espoused in academic or public discourse.”

“Evolutionary psychology is by no means immune to poor hypothesizing and we should always reflect on helping scholars to formulate their hypotheses with sufficient precision that they garner evidence for or against the hypothesized design features of a psychological mechanism,” explained Costello.

“Previous generations of our lab, led by David Lewis (who has been an amazing mentor to me) have taken a very proactive approach on this front. They published a terrific paper in American Psychologist called Evolutionary Psychology: A How to Guide. I encourage readers to read that article too.”

By documenting hypotheses that have been directly contradicted by empirical findings, the article argues that evolutionary psychology is not immune to disconfirmation but instead operates as a research program capable of generating testable (and falsifiable) claims.

The researcher shared that future work could examine whether academic and public perceptions of unfalsifiability have shifted since earlier surveys, and whether interventions such as reading the present article or taking an evolutionary psychology course change minds.

“I was pleased that the article was chosen as the APA Editor’s choice, which means it will be available to read ‘open access’ for 30 days since publication so please go and read it,” Costello told PsyPost. “Or reach out to me to get your hands on a PDF if you can’t gain access to it.” 

“Also, the article was published alongside two commentaries, who both agreed with our core argument that evolutionary psychology hypotheses are indeed falsifiable. Our reply gave us the opportunity to speak to some of evolutionary psychology’s other theoretical strengths (e.g., its heuristic value). That’s titled Beyond Falsifiability: Evolutionary Psychology’s Many Theoretical Strengths: Reply to Geary (2026) and Moore (2026) and I encourage people to read those also.”

William Costello is a doctoral researcher of Evolutionary Psychology at the University of Texas at Austin working under the supervision of Dr. David Buss. You can follow his work on ResearchGate, Google Scholar or on social media at X: @CostelloWilliam or BlueSky: @williamcostello.bsky.social

The research, “Evolutionary Psychology Hypotheses Are Testable and Falsifiable,” was authored by William Costello, Anna G. B. Sedlacek, Patrick K. Durkee, Courtney L. Crosby, Rebecka K. Hahnel-Peeters, and David M. Buss.