A new study suggests that individuals who leave their religion tend to become more politically liberal, often adopting views similar to those who have never been religious. This research, published in the Journal of Personality, provides evidence that the lingering effects of a religious upbringing may not extend to a person’s overall political orientation. The findings indicate a potential boundary for a psychological phenomenon known as “religious residue.”

Researchers conducted this study to investigate a concept called religious residue. This is the idea that certain aspects of a person’s former religion, such as specific beliefs, behaviors, or moral attitudes, can persist even after they no longer identify with that faith. Previous work has shown that these lingering effects can be seen in areas like moral values and consumer habits, where formerly religious people, often called “religious dones,” continue to resemble currently religious individuals more than those who have never been religious.

The research team wanted to determine if this pattern of residue also applied to political orientation. Given the strong link between religiosity and political conservatism in many cultures, it was an open question what would happen to a person’s politics after leaving their faith. They considered three main possibilities. One was that religious residue would hold, meaning religious dones would remain relatively conservative.

Another possibility was that they would undergo a “religious departure,” shifting to a liberal orientation similar to the never-religious. A third option was “religious reactance,” where they might react against their past by becoming even more liberal than those who were never religious.

To explore these possibilities, the researchers analyzed data from eight different samples across three multi-part studies. The first part involved a series of six cross-sectional analyses, which provide a snapshot in time. These studies included a total of 7,089 adults from the United States, the Netherlands, and Hong Kong. Participants were asked to identify as currently religious, formerly religious, or never religious, and to rate their political orientation on a scale from conservative to liberal.

In five of these six samples, the results pointed toward a similar pattern. Individuals who had left their religion reported significantly more liberal political views than those who were currently religious. Their political orientation tended to align closely with that of individuals who had never been religious. When the researchers combined all six samples for a more powerful analysis, they found that religious dones were, on average, more politically liberal than both currently religious and never-religious individuals. This combined result offered some initial evidence for the religious reactance hypothesis.

To gain a clearer picture of how these changes unfold over time, the researchers next turned to longitudinal data, which tracks the same individuals over many years. The second study utilized data from the National Study of Youth and Religion, a project that followed a representative sample of 2,071 American adolescents into young adulthood. This allowed the researchers to compare the political attitudes of those who remained affiliated with a religion, those who left their religion at different points, and those who were never religious.

The findings from this longitudinal sample provided strong support for the religious departure hypothesis. Individuals who left their religion during their youth or young adulthood reported more liberal political attitudes than those who remained religious. However, their political views were not significantly different from the views of those who had never been religious. This study also failed to find evidence for “residual decay,” the idea that religious residue might fade slowly over time. Instead, the shift toward a more liberal orientation appeared to be a distinct change associated with leaving religion, regardless of how long ago the person had de-identified.

The third study aimed to build on these findings with another longitudinal dataset, the Family Foundations of Youth Development project. This study followed 1,857 adolescents and young adults and had the advantage of measuring both religious identification and political orientation at multiple time points. This design allowed the researchers to use advanced statistical models to examine the sequence of these changes. Specifically, they could test whether becoming more liberal preceded leaving religion, or if leaving religion preceded becoming more liberal.

The results of this final study confirmed the findings of the previous ones. Religious dones again reported more liberal political attitudes, similar to their never-religious peers. The more advanced analysis revealed that changes in religious identity tended to precede changes in political orientation. In other words, the data suggests that an individual’s departure from religion came first, and this was followed by a shift toward a more liberal political stance. The reverse relationship, where political orientation predicted a later change in religious identity, was not statistically significant in this sample.

The researchers acknowledge some limitations in their work. The studies relied on a single, broad question to measure political orientation, which may not capture the complexity of political beliefs on specific social or economic issues. While the longitudinal designs provide a strong basis for inference, the data is observational, and experimental methods would be needed to make definitive causal claims. The modest evidence for religious reactance was only present in the combined cross-sectional data and may have been influenced by the age of the participants or other sample-specific factors.

Future research could explore these dynamics using more detailed assessments of political ideology to see if religious residue appears in certain policy areas but not others. Examining the role of personality traits like dogmatism could also offer insight into why some individuals shift their political views so distinctly.

Despite these limitations, the collection of studies provides converging evidence that for many people, leaving religion is associated with a clear and significant move toward a more liberal political identity. This suggests that as secularization continues in many parts of the world, it may be accompanied by corresponding shifts in the political landscape.

The study, “Religious Dones Become More Politically Liberal After Leaving Religion,” was authored by Daryl R. Van Tongeren, Sam A. Hardy, Emily M. Taylor, and Phillip Schwadel.

A new large-scale study of European adults suggests that, on average, being religiously educated as a child is associated with slightly poorer self-rated health after the age of 50. The research, published in the journal Social Science & Medicine, also indicates that this association is not uniform, varying significantly across different aspects of health and among different segments of the population.

Past research has produced a complex and sometimes contradictory picture regarding the connections between religiousness and health. Some studies indicate that religious involvement can offer health benefits, such as reduced suicide risk and fewer unhealthy behaviors. Other research points to negative associations, linking religious attendance with increased depression in some populations.

Most of this work has focused on religious practices in adulthood, leaving the long-term health associations of childhood religious experiences less understood. To address this gap, researchers set out to investigate how a religious upbringing might be linked to health outcomes decades later, taking into account the diverse life experiences that can shape a person’s well-being.

The researchers proposed several potential pathways through which a religious upbringing could influence long-term health. These include psychosocial mechanisms, where religion might foster positive emotions and coping strategies but could also lead to internal conflict or distress. Social and economic mechanisms might involve access to supportive communities and resources, while also potentially exposing individuals to group tensions.

Finally, behavioral mechanisms suggest religion may encourage healthier lifestyles, such as avoiding smoking or excessive drinking, which could have lasting positive effects on physical health. Given these varied and sometimes opposing potential influences, the researchers hypothesized that the link between a religious upbringing and late-life health would not be simple or consistent for everyone.

To explore these questions, the study utilized data from the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe, a major cross-national project. The analysis included information from 10,346 adults aged 50 or older from ten European countries. Participants were asked a straightforward question about their childhood: “Were you religiously educated by your parents?” Their current health was assessed through self-ratings on a five-point scale from “poor” to “excellent.” The study also examined more specific health indicators, including physical health (chronic diseases and limitations in daily activities), mental health (symptoms of depression), and cognitive health (numeracy and orientation skills).

The researchers employed an advanced statistical method known as a causal forest approach. This machine learning technique is particularly well-suited for identifying complex and non-linear patterns in large datasets. Unlike traditional methods that often look for straightforward, linear relationships, the causal forest model can uncover how the association between a religious upbringing and health might change based on a wide array of other factors. The analysis accounted for 19 different variables, including early-life circumstances, late-life demographics like age and marital status, and current religious involvement.

The overall results indicated that, on average, having a religious upbringing was associated with poorer self-rated health in later life. The average effect was modest, representing a -0.10 point difference on the five-point health scale. The analysis showed that for a majority of individuals in the sample, the association was negative.

However, the model also identified a smaller portion of individuals for whom the association was positive, suggesting that for some, a religious upbringing was linked to better health outcomes. This variation highlights that an average finding does not tell the whole story.

When the researchers examined different domains of health, a more nuanced picture emerged. A religious upbringing was associated with poorer mental health, specifically a higher level of depressive symptoms. It was also linked to poorer cognitive health, as measured by lower numeracy, or mathematical ability.

In contrast, the same childhood experience was associated with better physical health, indicated by fewer limitations in activities of daily living, which include basic self-care tasks like bathing and dressing. This suggests that a religious childhood may have different, and even opposing, associations with the physical, mental, and cognitive aspects of a person’s well-being in later life.

The study provided further evidence that the link between a religious upbringing and poorer self-rated health was not the same for all people. The negative association appeared to be stronger for certain subgroups. For example, individuals who grew up with adverse family circumstances, such as a parent with mental health problems or a parent who drank heavily, showed a stronger negative link between their religious education and later health.

Late-life demographic factors also seemed to modify the association. The negative link was more pronounced among older individuals (aged 65 and above), females, those who were not married or partnered, and those with lower levels of education. These findings suggest that disadvantages or vulnerabilities experienced later in life may interact with early experiences to shape health outcomes.

The analysis also considered how adult religious practices related to the findings. The negative association between a religious upbringing and later health was stronger for individuals who reported praying in adulthood. It was also stronger for those who reported that they never attended a religious organization as an adult. This combination suggests a complex interplay between past experiences and present behaviors.

The study does have some limitations. The data on religious upbringing and other childhood circumstances were based on participants’ retrospective self-reports, which can be subject to memory biases. The study’s design is cross-sectional, meaning it captures a snapshot in time and cannot establish a direct causal link between a religious upbringing and health outcomes. It is possible that other unmeasured factors, such as parental socioeconomic status, could play a role in this relationship. The measure of religious upbringing was also broad and did not capture the intensity, type, or strictness of the education received.

Future research could build on these findings by using longitudinal data to track individuals over time, providing a clearer view of how early experiences unfold into later life health. More detailed measures of religious education could also help explain why the experience appears beneficial for some health domains but detrimental for others. Researchers also suggest that exploring the mechanisms, such as coping strategies or social support, would provide a more complete understanding.

The study, “Heterogeneous associations between early-life religious upbringing and late-life health: Evidence from a machine learning approach,” was authored by Xu Zong, Xiangjiao Meng, Karri Silventoinen, Matti Nelimarkka, and Pekka Martikainen.